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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a
partnership, First Security Bank of Utah,
a Utah Corporation, and Zions First National Bank, a Utah Corporation, Mortgagees,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10594

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Condemnation action to acquire real property
owned by defendants in the vicinity of 2100 South
and Redwood Road in Salt Lake County, Utah for
use in the construction of a public highway facility
known as "I-215", commonly referred to as the "Belt
Route".
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The only issue in dispute was the amount of
just compensation to be paid to defendants, which
issue was tried to a jury. The trial commenced on
January 11, 1966 and was concluded on January 22,
1966. The issue of just compensation was submitted
1
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to the jury on special interrogatoires ( R. 53), the
answers to which fixed the amounts awarded as
(1) Total just compensation
(2) Value of 78.11 acres condemned

$359,877.00
318,301.00

Difference

$ 41,576.00

The difference between ( 1) and ( 2) above, i.e.
the sum of $41,576.00, represented the damages to
the remainder of defendant's lands not taken. Accordingly, judgment on the verdict was entered by
the trial court on January 22, 1966 in favor of defendants in the sum of $359,877.00 together with
interest and costs (R. 98-99). Defendant partnership
filed its Motions for additure and/or a new trial
(R. 107-109) and after a full hearing thereon such
Motions were denied ( R. 131). Thereupon defendant partnership filed its Notice Of Appeal solely
on issues of law (R.133).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On this appeal defendant seeks a reversal of the
judgment of the trial court and asks for a new trial
on the issue of just compensation. Plaintiff urges
this court to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent cannot agree with appellant's
"Statement Of Facts" for two reasons, to-wit:
( 1) Defendant states the facts in the
light most favorable to defendant, who lost
below, and in so doing violates the basic rule
2
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that the facts on appeal must be reviewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict below;
and
(2) Defendant does not confine its statement to facts, but repeatedly argues what the
facts should be, and in so doing repeatedly
emphasizes the opinions of defendant's experts and argues the comparative weight
thereof while denouncing the opinions of
plaintiff's experts.
And so plaintiff believes it not only proper but essential that a statement be made setting forth the
facts of the case with the foregoing rules in mind.
At the time of the commencement of this action
defendant owned or was purchasing approximately
926. 7 acres of land in Salt Lake County situated
generally between 2100 South and 3100 South
Streets and west of Redwood Road (Exh. D-1), being the area shaded in yellow, with the exception of
the pole line corridor as hereinafter noted. Within
defendant's overall boundary the three unshaded
areas shown in white are not owned by defendant.
The pole line corridor, being a strip of land approximately 165 feet wide (Tr. 518), cuts through the
westerly and southerly portion of the overall tract.
The corridor is shown on Exhibit D-1 and the map
attached to Appellant's Brief as two parallel lines
and on the Exhibit P-11 overlay as an orange strip.
It begins on the south side of 2100 South and runs
due south until it makes a turn to the southeast,
where it leaves the subject tract, and then follows
3
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parallel and adjacent thereto for approximately a
quarter of a mile, then back onto the tract and continues westerly along the south side of Decker Lake,
then onto Redwood Road. The corridor contains two
separate power lines, one supported by large steel
towers and the other by wooden poles and cross
arms (Exh. P-27). It is owned in fee by Utah Power And Light Company. However, defendant has a
reserved right to cross the corridor at any place
where there are no structures (Tr. 518, 519).
The south central part of the subject tract is
occupied by Decker Lake (Exhs. P-11, P-24, D-5),
embracing an area of approximately 180 acres when
the water is one foot deep (Tr. 75). Decker Lake is
surrounded by an earth fill embankment (Tr. 75)
and serves as a collection basin for surface run-off
and irrigation and tail water from canals to the
south and west which naturally drain to the Lake
(Tr. 73). In July, 1965 there were two basic inflows into Decker Lake, one coming from the south
in two different sources and one coming from the
west at about the center of the Lake in an open drain
(Tr. 74). The outflow from Decker Lake is through
an open drain runing from the east end of the Lake
to Jordan River, with an elevation such that the
water in the Lake remains at a depth of about one
foot (Tr. 75). The outflow drainage canal was constructed by three irrigation companies on the strip
of land owned by them in fee, pursuant to a Decree
of the court under which such companies have the
4
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right to drain their waste water into the Lake and
the duty to maintain the drainage canal from the
Lake (Tr. 103, Exh. P-20).
The topography of the land is relatively flat
with some depressions, natural swales and elevated
banks (Exhs. P-17, P-21, P-25). The water table
varies and is near the surface in places, particularly
in the swales and towards the north end (Tr. 108,
109, 111, 114-119 incl.). Two large open drains
enter the property from the west, one being approximately 20 feet in width and six to eight feet deep
(Tr. 483) and the other being approximately 15 feet
in width and six feet deep (Tr. 483, 484), which
drains cut across the property then join to the west
of the pole line corridor and enter Decker Lake near
the center thereof (Tr. 485, Exhs. D-1, P-11, P-18
P-19). Another open drain approximately 10 to 12
feet wide and four to five feet deep connected to the
foregoing drain just west of Decker Lake extends
to the north, running through the property and then
changes to a northeasterly direction until it leaves
the property at 2100 South (Tr. 486, 487, Exhs.
D-1, P-11).
The northerly portion of the property is traversed by the Brighton Canal extension which enters
from Redwood Road, continuing in a northwesterly
direction, changing to a southwesterly direction and
again changing to a northwesterly direction until it
leaves the property (Tr. 101, 102, Exhs. D-1, P-11,
P-18, P-19).
5
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The north boundary of the property fronted
on the south side of 2100 South Street. There were
no traveled ways directly from 2100 South Street
onto the subject property along the entire 2400 feet
of frontage. There existed (and presently exists) a
gravel surface roadway known as Pole Line Road,
sometimes referred to as 2700 West Street, which
extended both north and south from 2100 South
Street. The intersection of Pole Line Road and 2100
South Street is located on the property adjoining
and immediately to the west of the subject property
( Exhs. P-2, P-11) . From that intersection Pole
Line Road runs due south on the adjoining property,
across the Brighton Canal by means of a timber
bridge and then enters the subject property, continuing thereon almost due south to approximately
the "Singleton" tract (Tr. 505, Exh. P-11). Pole
Line Road has been in existence for at least 45
years (Tr. 123, 124) and has a gravel surface 32
feet in width (Tr. 597). In 1948 it was graveled by
Salt Lake County for approximately one-half mile
(Tr. 596) and its appearance hasn't changed materially since 1948 (Tr. 596). During at least the
years 1947, 1948, 1953 through 1960 Pole Line Road
was maintained by Salt Lake County, including
snow removal (Tr. 598, 599). The bridge across the
Brighton Canal extension has been repaired by Salt
Lake County and the road has been marked with a
Salt Lake County sign designating it as a "Dead
6
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End" street. Pole Line Road does not extend through
the property to 3100 South Street (Tr. 600).
At the southerly end of Pole Line Road an unimproved roadway connects therewith which runs
in an easterly direction and then divides, with one
segment going southerly along the west side of Decker Lake and ending at the open drain coming from
the west into and at the center of the Lake. The
other segment of the unimproved roadway continues
around the north end of Decker Lake and down the
east side, terminating near the open drainage canal
owned and maintained by the three canal companies
( Exh. P-11).
On the east the property is bounded by the west
side of Redwood Road and has some 2750 feet of
frontage on Redwood Road along three segments.
On the south the subject property is bounded by the
north side of 3100 South Street and has some 2700
feet of frontage thereon. There were no traveled
ways directly from 3100 South Street onto the subject property along such frontage. However, 2700
West Street (Pole Line Road) has been constructed
from the north line of 3100 South Street on prope1ty to the west which extends northerly to the south
line of the subject property (Exhs. D-1, P-11).
As of the commencement of this action the subject property was essentially undeveloped and unimproved. The reason why it remains undeveloped
and unimproved is of no moment here, whether it be
for the reasons suggested by appellant on pages 4
7
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and 5 of its Brief or because of lack of demand, financial ability or the like. Important is the fact that
Mr. Haynie, one of the managing partners of defendant partnership, at the time of the initial negotiations for the acquisition of the subject property,
had knowledge that the alignment of the Belt Route
through defendant's property was one of the routes
then being considered, except for the type of interchange with the 2100 South Expressway (Tr. 59-61,
incl.). However, the saliant fact is that the subject
property was undeveloped and unimproved at the
time of the commencement of this action.
This action was commenced on July 12, 1965
and the date of taking was fixed as July 12, 1965
(R. 53). The total area of defendant's property
sought to be condemned is 78.11 acres, of which
76.65 acres are taken in fee and 1.46 acres are taken
for drainage easements ( R. 101-106 incl.) . The
highway facilities to be constructed are a part of
Interstate 215, commonly referred to as the "Belt
Route" and is designated as a limited access facility
(R. 3). Access to and from this highway facility in
the vicinity of the subject property will be limited
to the interchange with 2100 South Street. That
portion of the subject property fronting on 2100
South Street, being approximately 2400 feet in
length, is being taken to accommodate the interchange with 2100 South Street (Exhs. D-1, P-2.
P-11). Drainage facilities will be constructed adjacent to the highway facility in both the southeast
8
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and southwest quadrants of the interchange and
near the north line of 3100 South Street immediately east of the highway facility (Tr. 23-26 incl.).
From the south end of the interchange to 3100 South
Street the width of the property taken is approximately 260 feet (Tr. 8).
The interchange between the Belt Route and
2100 South Street will be a clover leaf design with
the Belt Route overpassing 2100 South Street on an
earth fill structure ( Exh. P-2). There will be no
interchange at 3100 South Street but the Belt Route
will overpass 3100 South Street on an earth fill
structure. The earth fill structure for the overpass
at 3100 South Street will be approximately 22 to 25
feet high (Tr. 7), not 22 to 35 feet as stated on page
9 of Appellant's Brief, and the fill will be approximately the same height at the interchange with 2100
South Street (Tr. 18-19). From both the overpass
at 3100 South Street and the interchange at 2100
South Street the highway facility has a descending
slope until the height of the fill averages approximately 8 feet between those two structures through
the remainder of defendant's property (Tr. 17, 18).
As to the intersection between 2100 South
Street and Pole Line Road (2700 ·west) going south,
the northerly section of Pole Line Road will be relocated approximately 350 feet to the west and there
an at-grade intersection will be established as shown
on Exhibit P-2 (Tr. 21, 22, 23, 39, 40, 41 and 42).
9
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No plan exists to change the physical access existing
on July 12, 1965 to and from 2100 South Street to
defendant's property via Pole Line Road except for
relocating the at-grade intersection 350 feet to the
west.
And so with that descripti'on of the physical
features of the subject property and the location and
nature of the highway facility to be constructed, the
parties proceeded with the trial of the case. Defendants first called as an adverse witness Jerry D.
Fenn, a design engineer employed by the State Road
Commission, who testified as to the nature and type
of highway facility to be constructed adjacent to
and through defendant's property (Tr. 1-43, incl.).
Thereupon, and at the request of both parties, the
jury viewed the subject property (Tr. 44-45).
Thereafter defendant called as witnesses three
valuation experts, Messrs. Loll, Solomon and Kiepe;
and plaintiff called as witnesses two valuation experts, Messrs. Fletcher and Johns. All five valuation
experts gave as their opinions the following breakdown as to the value of the 78.11 acres of land taken
and the amount of severance or consequential damages, if any, to the remaining 848.59 acres not taken.
However, appraiser Solomon, witness for the defendant, actually gave two separate opinions which we
number ( 1 ) and ( 2) , the latter being the one finally
adopted by him and about which we will have more
to say later.
10
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For the defendantMaxwell Loll
Value of 78.11 acres taken
Damage to remainder

$357,105.00
315,415.00

Total
C. Francis Solomon ( 1)
Value of 78.11 acres taken
Damage to remainder

$672,520.00

Total
C. Francis Solomon (2)
Value of 78.11 acres taken
Damage to remainder
Total
Werner Kiepe
Value of 78.11 acres taken
Damage to remainder

$481,000.00

$366,050.00
309,120.00

Total

$675,170.00

For the plciintiffR. S. Fletcher
Value of 78.11 acres taken
Damage to remainder
Total
A. B. C. Johns
Value of 78.11 acres taken
Damage to remainder $44,183.00
Less special benefits
26,582.00
Net damages
Total

$302,931.00
178,069.00

$308,289.00
251,711.00
$560,000.00

$332,120.00

-0-

$332, 120.00
$236,076.00
17,601.00
$253,677.00

And so after nine days of trial and five and onehalf hours of deliberation the jury found the values
as follows:
Value of 78.11 acres taken
Damages to remainder

Total

$318,301.00
41,576.00
$359,877.00

11
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·with that setting in mind, we now return to
appellant's "Statement Of Facts" and note that
ninety percent of what appears on the first thirty
pages of Appellant's Brief is devoted not to a Statement Of Facts but to the claims, contentions and
assertions of defendant as to its theory of the case,
repeated emphasis of the opinions of defendant's
expert witnesses, criticism of the opinions of plaintiff's expert witnesses and a lengthy argument of
those opinions, the qualifications of the expert witnesses and the credibility of their testimony and the
weight which should be given to that testimony.
Needless to say, those were all matters for the jury
to weigh and consider in reaching its verdict, and
are not open to argument by appellant to this court
on appeal where the appeal is solely on issues of law.
Likewise such matters might well be outside of the
legitimate area of comment by respondent, but
since they are presented in Appellant's Brief we feel
obliged to make some response thereto. And so, referring to Appellant's Brief, we note:
Pages 4 through 8 are devoted to an argument
of what defendant contends to be the advantages of
the property, confined to what defendant's experts
had to say about it in their opinions and "informed"
judgments while giving only lip service to the disadvantages of the property.
Pages 10 through 15, inclusive, and the matters
set forth in sub-paragraph (a) through ( i), inclu12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sive, are nothing more than an argument in support
of the views and opinions expressed by defendant's
witnesses and clearly are not in keeping with the
time honored rule that the facts (to the extent such
matters contain facts as distinguished from opinions) must be stated in the light most favorable to
the verdict below. Thus, whether it is more advantageous to devolp the remaining property in several
tracts as against one whole tract (a), or whether
gone was this or gone was that or what Kiepe had
to say about it (b), or the effect of providing no
crossings through defendant's lands ( c), or what
effect taking the 2100 South frontage or what Solomon had to say about it ( d), or what Solomon and
Kiepe had to say about the industrial lands remaining west of the freeway ( i) , the commercial acreage
east of the freeway, the residential land east of the
freeway or the residential land west of the freeway
(h), or the sewer and water (i) were all matters
for the jury to weigh in reaching its decision as to
whether and to what extent the remaining properties were depreciated in value by reason of the taking and the construction of the highway facility in
this case. The jury has spoken on all of these matters
through its verdict and that should end it.
Likewise the selected excerpts from the Record
outlined on pages 16 to 18, inclusive, as to the reasoning of appraiser Fletcher in support of his opinion that there was no severange damage, whether
consistent or inconsistent or whether he was evasive
13
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or unresponsive, went to the credibility of his testimony, which was for the jury to weigh and not for
appellant to argue in this appeal. And the same can
be said for the comments on the testimony of appraiser Johns in the selected excerpts outlined on
pages 19 to 21, inclusive.
Again the qualifications of the appraisers set
forth on pages 23 to 26, inclusive, were matters for
the jury to weigh in passing on the credibility and
weight to be given to the testimony of those witnesses. Significant is the fact that defendants made
no objection as to qualifications when both of plaintiff's valuation witnesses were asked for their opinions on values herein. However, since appellant has
devoted only one short paragraph each to the qualifications of plaintiff's appraisers, we believe it appropriate to make the following further statement
thereof:
R. S. Fletcher, M.A.!. - in the real estate business since 194 7 and a fee appraiser since 1952.
Since 1958 served as President of Fletcher-Lucas
Investment Company, a real estate company which
has existed since 1923. He has been a broker since
1957 or 1958 and has engaged in the buying and
selling of residential, commercial and industrial
properties principally in Salt Lake County. He holds
a degree from the University of Utah in business
and a Master's Degree from Harvard in business
administration. Mr. Fletcher completed courses
given by the American Institute in 1949 and has
14
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since fulfilled the rest of the requirements for membership with the M.A.I. designation. He has appraised several thousand individual properties of all
types and descriptions. Representatives of his clients
are Federal, State, County, City, School Districts,
major banks, saving and loan associations, mortgage
loan companies, life insurance companies, oil companies, local investors, attorneys and other real
estate companies. His appraisals for governmental
bodies and individuals are about equally divided
(Tr. 603-608). Also Mr. Fletcher appraised the fair
market value of the subject property in 1961 for an
investor who was interested in purchasing the property from the Falconaero Corporation, defendant's
predecessor (Tr. 609-613).
A. B. C. Johns, Jr., M.A.!. - engaged in the
vocation of real estate appraiser since 1951. He
graduated from the University of Houston in business administration in 1949 and has taken post graduate studies in real estate appraising, including the
courses sponsored by the American Institute, at the
University of Utah and University of Southern California. Having taken an instructor's course in
teaching real estate appraisal, he has taught the subject at the University of Utah Extension Division,
Brigham Young University and Weber College. Mr.
Johns obtained his M.A.I. designation in 1962
(either erroneously or facetiously designated M.I.A.
on page 25 of Appellant's Brief), and has been a
senior member of the Society of Real Estate Ap15
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praisers since 1958, having served as President of
the local Chapter and a director and member of the
International Board of Governors of that organization. Since 1962 he has been a partner of Cook &
Johns, a real estate company in Salt Lake City,
Utah, and although Mr. Johns does not personally
have a broker's license the company does. He is a
fee appraiser and has appraised properties for
federal and state agencies, oil companies, the power
company, a number of large nationally known banks
and insurance companies and for individuals. His
work is about balanced between individuals and governmental bodies. He has appraised industrial, commercial and residential properties and has appraised a number of properties along the south leg of the
Belt Route (Tr. 759-764).
As to the acreage values and comparable sales
of witnesses outlined on pages 26 and 27 of Appellant's Brief, the statement that the sales of comparable properties utilized by the witnesses for defendant were probative and more relevant to the subject
property is argumentative and the opinion of the
appellant only and apparently one not shared by the
jury in this case. In appellant's summary of the
opinions of the witnesses on page 26 of Appellant's
Brief the statement that Mr. Johns appraised the
residential area at $177.00 per acre is simply not
true. Mr. Johns put a value of $177.00 per acre on
the land embraced within Decker Lake only, and as
to the unzoned residential property outside of Deck16
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er Lake Mr. Johns put a value of $1, 725.00 per acre
on it. Likewise, Mr. Fletcher put a value of $200.00
per acre on the land embraced within Decker Lake
and a value of $1,500.00 per acre on the unzoned
residential land not occupied by Decker Lake.
The summary of the sales contained on page
27 of Appellant's Brief is highly selective. Needless
to say, the jury had before it all of the sales offered
in evidence, including those offered by plaintiff
(Exh. P-11 overlay).
We have no quarrel with the summary of the
market value of opinions of the witnesses as summarized on page 28 of Appellant's Brief, except that
we should make mention of the C. Francis Solomon
No. (1) appraisal (Tr. 307, 311, Exh. D-7), to-wit:
Value of total tract before
Value of remainder tract
Difference or just compensation
(rounded)

$3,169,651.00
2,689,000.00
$ 481,00000

As to page 29 of Appellant's Brief pertaining
to the instructions of the court, we note that appellant made no request for an instruction that the
verdict could be within the range of the total value
testimony, if the preponderance was less than the
value conclusions of the landowner but more than
the government's testimony.
As to the special interrogatories returned by
the jury, we note that on page 30 of Appellant's
Brief the answer to No. 4 should be $318,301.00
and not $308,301.00. We make the further observa17
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tion that all of the claims, contentions and assertions of defendant and the opinions of the experts,
the credibility of their testimony and the weight
thereof are summed up in capsule form and with
finality in the jury's answers to the special interrogatories.
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW
TRIAL

Throughout appellant's "Statement Of Facts"
and "Argument" it blindly assumes that as of July
12, 1965 the entire 926. 7 acres was on the verge of
being transformed overnight into a Utopian development of residential, commercial and industrial complexes fully integrated into a veritable "Garden of
Eden" ( Exh. D-4) from the raw undeveloped acreage it was, severed by a 165 foot pole line corridor,
cut by several deep open drains, traversed by a large
irrigation canal and approximately one-fifth covered by a lake in the bottom of a natural waste water
drainage and collection basin with a high water
table (Exh. P-11). Defendant l'Ooks at the property
through the rose colored glasses of a promoter-speculator, seeing only the advantages and ignoring
the disadvantages, apparently hoping that the latter somehow would go away. Then comes the taking.
Now defendant looks at the remaining property
through different glasses and sees nearly complete
ruination and what was once a "Garden of Eden"
now becomes a "No Man's Land".
18
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However, the jury viewed the premises and saw
the property for what it was first hand and, having
heard the evidence, looked through the eyes of the
reasonable man and made up its own mind as to
wherein the truth lies.
Likewise, defendant places its valuation experts
Solomon and Kiepe high on top of the pedestals of
competency and credibility, who, as defendant argues on page 37 of Appellant's Brief, "stand head
and shoulders above all other witnesses", particularly plaintiff's witness Johns, who defendant states is
completely mismatched in qualifications with Solomon and Kiepe (Ibid p. 38). Defendant characterizes Solomon and Kiepe as the "believable" witnesses
(Ibid p. 32) with "informed" judgments (Ibid p.
36) and repeatedly "weighs" their testimony against
that of Fletcher and Johns (Ibid pp. 37-38). Our
answer is that defendant apparently holds the competency and credibility of Solomon and Kiepe in
much higher esteem than did the jury. And we reiterate that such comparisons were within the exclusive province of the jury and are not open for
argument by defendant in this appeal.
However, defendant argues that because of the
above the plain conclusion in the minds of reasonable
men makes the jury award so "pitifully inadequate"
as to transcend and shock the ordinary senses of justice and common sense. And so we ask, what is so
shocking about an award of $318,301.00 for the
78.11 acres of land taken when it is over $10,000.00
19
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more than the finally adopted value of $308,289.00
placed thereon by defendant's own esteemed witness
C. Francis Solomon? Likewise, we ask, what is so
shocking about an award of $41,576.00 in severance
damages when it is $41,576.00 more than what
plaintiff's witness Fletcher placed on it and $23,975.00 more than what plaintiff's witness Johns
placed on it? . What is so "pitifully inadequate" about
that? Is it shocking to the ordinary sense of justice
or common sense just because the jury didn't swallow hook line and sinker the final opinion of Solomon of over $250,000.00 in severance damages or
the opinion of Kiepe of over $300,000.00 in severance damages to land which the State was not even
taking? Are the severance damages somewhere between $250,000.00 and $300,000.00 as a matter of
law just because Solomon and Kiepe said so? Of
course not. And defendant should not even be heard
to complain about it.
Nowhere in Appellant's Brief does it contend
that the amount of $318,301.00 awarded for the
78.11 acres of land taken is inadequate. And it
would be ludicrous to so do since the amount is over
$10,000.00 more than the amount placed thereon by
defendant's own witness Solomon. What defendant
is complaining about is that the amount of $41,576.00 awarded for severance damages is inadequate. And so the gist of defendant's argument is
that it is entitled to a new trial simply because the
jury chose not to believe Solomon or Kiepe on the
amount of severance damages only.
To accept defendant's appraisal of the apprais20
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als of Solomon and Kiepe would cause one to wonder
why the jury did not believe defendant's witnesses
Solomon and Kiepe and accept their testimony at
face value. We need only to go to the record and the
stage set at the trial to learn why.
First, Mr. Solomon took some twelve pages of
transcript to state his qualifications (Tr. 243-254
incl.). While we disagree with Mr. Solomon's opinions, particularly on severance damages, we have no
quarrel with his qualifications; but it is not for us
to say whether he is more or less qualified than the
other valuation witnesses. That was for the jury to
evaluate. Such evaluation was not based solely upon
his qualifications or his record. The jury's appraisal
of the Solomon appraisal rested upon his performance in the witness chair and not on his laurels. And
what of his performance? It is documented in 155
pages of transcript (Tr. 243-397 incl.) and Exhibits
D-7 and D-9.
To begin with, on direct examination the witness Solomon was very thorough and precise. He
methodically expressed his opinions as to the "before" value of the entire 926. 7 acres on a per acre
value basis and the resulting total for each zoning
land classification and the unzoned land (Tr. 298307 incl.), with the end result that in his opinion the
total "before" value of the entire 926. 7 acres of
land was $3,169,651.00 (Tr. 307; Exh. D-7). He
then proceeded to state his opinions of the "after"
value of each land classification of the remaining
21
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lands, explaining which portions thereof in his opinion had been "damaged" and why (Tr. 307-321
incl.), with the end result that in his opinion the remaining 848.59 acres of land had a value of $2,689,000.00 after condemnation (Tr. 311; Exh. D-7).
He then gave a breakdown of his opinion for
the value of the land taken and the severance damages to the remaining land, which we call the Solomon No. (1) appraisal, as follows (Tr. 321-322,
352; Exh. D-7):
Value of 49 plus or minus acres
industrial taken
Value 29 acres residential taken

$235,419.00
67,519.00

Value of land taken
Severance damages

$302,931.00
178,069.00
$481,000.00

Total

And so it developed on cross examination that Mr.
Solomon became confused when pressed for a breakdown on the amount he had assigned as damage to
the remaining unzoned residential property (Tr.
351-354 incl.), at which point he realized that he
"goofed" on his appraisal. So a one-half hour recess
was taken for him to compute it, but to no avail (Tr.
355). On re-direct counsel for defendant attempted
to rehabilitate Mr. Solomon (Tr. 369-372) and when
unable to do so requested a recess at 11 :50 A.M.
(Tr. 373).
And so upon reconvening court at 2 :00 P.M. a
most dramatic sequence of events followed. Mr. Sol01non admitted that he, Mr. Haynie, Mr. Moyle and
22
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defendant's counsel had worked during the noon recess from 12 :00 to 2 :00 o'clock P.M. with a calculator in the courtroom and re-worked Mr. Solomon's
figures (Tr. 384- 385), with the end result that Mr.
Solomon had changed his total figure for the value
of the land taken and severance damage by approximately $80,000.00 upwards (Tr. 388), actually
$'79,000.00. Yet he steadfastly maintained that he
had not changed his opinion on the amount of damage per acre over his previous testimony (Tr. 379,
380, 385, 388). However, in his final analysis he
came up with an opinion of a total of $560,000.00
for the value of the land taken and severance damages (Tr. 379; Exh. D-9).
What was even more penetrating was his very
positive assertion that his opinions of the value of
the condemned acreage in the industrial and residential areas, per acre (D-9), had in no way changed from his opinion recorded the day before (Tr.
380; Exh. D-7). He then computed the value of the
49.11 acres of industrial land taken at $239,605.00
and the value of the 29 acres of residential land
taken at $68,684.00 (Tr. 384). A comparison between his testimony recorded on Exhibit D-7 and
Exhibit D-9 shows otherwise. Thus
Value of 49.11 acres
ind us trial taken
Value of 29 acres
residential taken

Total

D-9

D-7

$239,605.00

$235,419.00

68,684.00

67,512.00

$308,289.00

$302,931.00

23
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Thus within the short span of one day the opinion
of Mr. Solomon had increased the value of the 49.11
acres of industrial land taken by $4,186.00 and had
increased the value of the 29 acres of residential
land taken by $1,172.00, or an increased from one
day to the next of $5,358.00 in the land taken.
It was indeed unfortunate for Mr. Solomon that
such sequence of events occurred. The writer has the
greatest respect for the ability and qualifications of
Mr. Solomon. But that is of no moment here. Nor
is defendant's evaluation of Mr. Solomon's competency or credibility of any probative value. That was
solely within the province of the jury. But it does
demonstrate the wisdom of the time-honored rule
that the trier of the facts, be it judge or jury, who
has the great advantage of a live-action, first row
view of the appearance and demeanor of the witness
during the course of his testimony, is by far the
better judge of his credibility and the weight to be
given to his testimony than does an appellate court
on the basis of a cold, typewritten transcript of his
testimony. Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15
Utah (2d) 113, 388 Pac. (2d) 409 ( 1964).

What then of the testimony of Mr. Kiepe? We
have no real quarrel with the qualifications of Mr.
Kiepe, but again it is not for us to say how he stacks
up against the other witnesses. As with Mr. Solomon, the jury's appraisal of the Kiepe appraisal rested upon his performance in the witness chair and
not on his laurels.
24
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The real argument we have with the testimony
of Mr. Kiepe relates to his opinions on the nature
and extent of severance damages. For example, in
his view a total of 563 acres of the remaining land
have "suffered damage" as a result of the condemnation, which would be equivalent to over 56 down
town Salt Lake City blocks (Tr. 508). And in his
judgment the whole of the remaining unzoned land
comprising 436.69 acres would be damaged anywhere from $150.00 per acre to $1,150.00 per acre
for a total damage of $106,943.00, including a damage of $200.00 per acre for every acre in the bottom
of Decker Lake (Tr. 515, 516; Exh. D-10). Likewise in his opinion the unzoned land as far as six to
seven blocks away would be damaged by reason of
the construction of the Belt Route through the defendant's property (Tr. 517).
vVhat is more, Mr. Kiepe then assigned a damage of $56,000.00 to the C-2 commercial property
which fronts on Redwood Road and is situated some
three-fourths of a mile away from the proposed Belt
Route (Tr. 472; Exh. D-1). The basis of that opinion was because the C-2 property appeared to have
a shopping "hinterland" which lay south and west
of it (Tr. 472), including the lands outside of the
subject property (Tr. 508) and after the Belt Route
is completed the people from those areas (both within and without the subject property) who would
shop at the fictional shopping center would have a
more circuitous route to get to the fictional shopping
25
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center (Tr. 473) . For this the State should pay
$56,000.00 in his opinion. Needless to say, the jury
did not share his views.
Without belaboring the point, a sampling of the
many little side comments of Mr. Kiepe in giving his
testimony is worthy of note. For example, he referred to Pole Line Road (2700 West) as "a trail - I
say a trail but let's say a road into his property"
(Tr. 427). Apparently what he did not know is
that the jury had already seen Pole Line Road during its view of the premises. Throughout his testimony Mr. Kiepe was determined that he was going
to impress the jury with his thoroughness. Thus,
when checking for his notes on the Rowland sale he
quipped, "My notes are rather voluminous in this
case" (Tr. 470). But he went a little too far and
in so doing didn't level with the jury. 'Thus, when
asked on cross examination how he verified the sale
to Arnold Machinery Company, Mr. Kiepe stated
that he had done a number of appraisals for the Arnold family and when he called Mr. Arnold was
not in. When Mr. Arnold, the president of the Company, called Mr. Kiepe's office his secretary took the
message. The sales data on that sale which Mr.
Kiepe testified to was given to him by his secretary
in response to her telephone call with the president
of Aronld Machinery Company (Tr. 501, 502). Mr.
Kiepe was very positive about this. Yet later when
Raymond L. Arnold, President of Arnold Machinery
Company for the last twenty years, was called by
26
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plaintiff as a witness he testified that although he
knew Werner Kiepe he had never had a conversation
with Mr. Kiepe with respect to the purchase or purchase price of the property and that he had never
had a conversation with Mr. Kiepe's secretary with
respect to the property or the price paid for it (Tr.
586). What effect that had in the minds of the
jurors will never be known. However, it is obvious
from the verdict that the jury did not accept Mr.
Kiepe's opinion of nearly one-third of a million dollars in severance damages to the remaining property
not taken.
Since we are still talking about appraisers, we
note that appellant's statement on page 37 of its
Brief that the witness John's appraisal of the residential lands was 800% to 1100% below any of the
other witnesses', is simply not true. Nor is it true
that Johns appraised the residential land at $177.00
per acre. The fact is that Johns appraised the unzoned residential land outside of Decker Lake at
$1,725.00 per acre, which is $225.00 per acre more
than the witness Fletcher's valuation and $75.00
per acre more than defendant's own witness Solomon's valuation. Johns did appraise the value of
only the lands occupied by Decker Lake at $177.00
per acre. Likewise Fletcher appraised the lands occupied by Decker Lake at $200.00 per acre, but appellant takes no such offense to that. What is really
so incredulous as to violate all rational thoughtis appellant's distortion of these facts on page 37 of its
Brief.
27
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All of the arguments made by appellant as to
the inadequacy of the award were presented to the
trial court in defendant's Motion For New Trial
( R. 108) . After a full hearing thereon and after
briefs were submitted to the trial court on the matters contained in Point II of Appellant's Brief by
both parties (R. 110-130 incl.) the trial court denied defendant's Motion For New Trial. In reviewing the trial court's ruling denying defendant's Motion For New Trial on grounds of inadequacy of
the damages, this court is limited to a determination of whether such a ruling was an abuse of discretion. Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah (2d) 1, 261 Pac.
(2d) 670 (1953). The guiding principles in this
area of the law are well set forth in Schneider v.
Suhrmann, 8 Utah ( 2d) 35, 327 Pac. ( 2d) 822
( 1958). Thus on pages 40 and 41 of the Utah Reports it is stated:
"Cases dealing with the review of damages, found by a jury, with 'invariable consistency, recite the reluctance of courts to interfere with such verdicts if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence upon which they
can be sustained.... "
This court then went on to give the basis for the
rule pointing up the advantages of the fact trier as
being in immediate contact with the trial, the
parties and the witnesses and the question of damages with respect to which reasonable minds are
apt to differ greatly as being matters which a jury
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is peculiarly adapted to determine. Then continuing
on page 41 Ibid it is stated:
". . . It is in order to preserve this right
of trial by jury, and to afford litigants the
advantages referred to above, that it has been
the policy of courts to exercise forebearance
in disturbing jury verdicts and to allow their
deliberations to s w i n g like a pendulum
through a wide arc without interference so
long as they remain within the bounds of reason. The refusal of the trial court to modify
the verdict endows it with some further degree of sanctity which increases our hesitancy in disturbing it upon review... "
See also Stam,p v. Union Pacific Rail1·oad Company,
5 Utah (2d) 397, 303 Pac. (2d) 279 (1956); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah (2d) 152, 379 Pac. (2d) 380
(1963); and Jorgenson v. Gonzales, 14 Utah (2d)
330, 383 Pac. (2d) 934 (1963).
And in Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah (2d) 42,
327 Pac. (2d) 826 ( 1958) this court re-affirmed its
responsibility to be indulgent towards the verdict of
the jury and not to disturb it so long as it is within
the bounds of reason, in accordance with the principles set forth in the companion case of Schneider
v. Suhrmann, supra, and also that it is primarily
the prerogative and duty of the trial court to pass
upon the adequacy of the verdict and to order any
necessary modifications thereof.
The above principles are well summed up in
the case of Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated, 15 Utah (2d) 113, 388 Pac. (2d) 409 (1964)
29
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wherein on page 116 of the Utah Reports it is
stated:
"Due to their advantaged position in close
proximity to the trial, the parties and the
witnesses; and their practical knowledge of
the affairs of life as a background against
which to weigh the evidence, the assessment
of damages is something peculiarly within
the prerogative of the jury to determine, and
the court is extremely reluctant to interfere
with their judgment in that regard. From the
plaintiff's point of view, her insistence that
the award is inadequate to her needs and desires is understandable. But we are obliged
to look at the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the verdict. In doing so, we
do not see it as so entirely beyond reason as
to require that we upset it.
"Under our system it is contemplated
that the right to trial by jury be assured.
This is something more than a high-sounding
phrase to be declaimed on patriotic occasions.
It is the duty of courts to honor it in the observance. Whenever there is genuine dispute
as to issues of fact upon which the parties'
rights depend, they are entitled to have them
submitted to and settled by a jury. When the
parties have had a full and fair opportunity
to present their cause, and the jury has rendered its verdict, it should not be interfered
with unless there appears some compelling
reason why justice demands that it be
done ... "
Defendant's whole argument is centered around
its claimed inadequacy of the damages to the re30
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mainder of the land not taken and as such comes
squarely within the principles of law applicable to
the jury assessment of damages outlined above. Defendant attacks the validity of the award on the
basis of what the jury determined the "before"
value of the entire 926. 7 acres to be, and says
it was on this Interrogatory that all other Interrogatories depended. This, of course, does not follow.
The special in terroga:tories couched in terms of the
"before" and "after'' values were simply the means
to the end, i.e. to determine the amount of just compensation to which defendants are entitled. Nor can
we go behind the answers to the special interrogatories and analyze or speculate as to the process by
which the jury arrived at them. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District v. Nelson, 11 Utah (2d) 253,
358 Pac. (2d) 81 (1960). In that case this court
affirmed an award based upon answers to special
interrogatories where the jury chose the "before"
value of the plaintiff's appraiser and the "after"
value of defendant's appraiser. Under the rationale
of that case the jury here could well have found the
"before" value of defendant's witness Solomon and
the "after" value of defendant's witness Loll, to-wit:
Solomon "before" value

$3,169,651.00
2,844,070.00

Loll "after" value

$ 325,581.00

Difference
31
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And so an award of $325,581.00 based thereon
would have been within the range of the evidence in
this case. Thus for defendant to say that without
the testimony of plaintiff's witness Johns the jury's
answer to Interrogatory No. 1 would be contrary to
law is nonsense.
Nor do the cases of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Moore, 2 Utah (2d) 254, 272
Pac. (2d) 176 (1954) or Porcupine Reservoir Company v. Keller Corporation, 15 Utah (2d) 318, 392
Pac. (2d) 620 (1964) so hold. Thus in the Moore
case, supra, the award was based upon 233 acres of
land whereas only 219.3 acres were taken; and since
the award was based on an erroneous acreage it
could not stand. And in the Porcupine case, supra,
the trial court by granting an additure indicated
that in its opinion the verdict was less than the lowest amounts which the jury could reasonably award
under the evidence. Noting this and after carefully
studying the record, this court concluded that the
jury verdicts were unusually small, suggesting passion or prejudice or a misunderstanding of the law
or facts presented.
\Vhile an award which is below the lowest valuation evidence or above the highest valuation would
require a close look at the evidence to determine
whether there was passion, bias or prejudice or a
misunderstanding of the law or facts presented, it
is the latter and not the former, standing by itself,
32
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which would warrant a trial court or this court on
appeal to grant a new trial.
This case is a classical example of the great
divergence which can exist among the opinions of
the experts where the real issue is the somewhat
evasive element of severance damages. It is based
entirely on the opinion of the experts and depending upon how they look at it they can vary as here
from zero to $315,415.00. In determining the value
of the lands taken the experts can at least use comparable sales as a guide line. But not so with severance damage. And so that is all the more reason
why the jury is better adapted to decide it.
Looking to the jury's award in this case of
$359,877.00 we find that it is $27,757.00 above
plaintiff's highest valuation witness Fletcher and
$200,123.00 below defendant's lowest valuation witness Solomon. Needless to say it is clearly within the
range of the evidence. Looking further at the breakdown of the total award the amount of $318,301.00
for the value of the land taken is $10,012.00 above
defendant's own witness Solomon's final valuation.
Likewise the award of $41,576.00 in severance damages is $41,576.00 higher than plaintiff's lowest
valuation witness on severance damages, Fletcher,
who found none; $23,975.00 more than plaintiff's
highest valuation witness on severance damages,
Johns; and is $210,135.00 lower than defendant's
lowest valuation witness on severance damages,
Solomon. Again the award for severance damages
33
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is clearly within the range of the evidence. That
being so, how can it be said that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to grant defendant
a new trial? Accordingly, the trial court did not err,
and its order denying defendant a new trial must
be affirmed by this court.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMITING CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS JOHNS ON HIS PRIOR APPRAISAL OF
THE CONDAS PROPERTY

At the outset it should be noted that the Point
here raised by defendant was presented to the trial
court in defendant's Motion For New Trial (paragraph 3 (a), R. 108). After a full hearing thereon
both parties submitted Briefs to the trial court in
support of their respective positions (R. 110-130
incl.). Thereupon the trial court denied defendant's
Motion For New Trial (R. 131).
It should also be noted that the question was

asked late on the last day of trial at approximately
5 :30 p.m., after the court advised the jury that we
would finish the evidence that day and on that basis
left to the jury as to whether they wanted to come
back the next day, on Saturday, rather than the following Monday (Tr. 817-819).
Throughout defendant's argument it assumes
that suficient similarity existed between the Condas
property and the subject property to warrant the
34
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inquiry in this case into the prior appraisal of the
witness Johns of the Condas property. The fact is
that a foundation had not been laid for this inquiry.
The only foundation laid was that the Condas property was in the county, had "M-1" zoning, had access to 2100 South and to Redwood Road (Tr. 828),
probably abutted upon the Gedge tract and was in
the same proximity of the subject "M-2'' property
(Tr. 842-843) . However, no foundation was laid
to show when the witness Johns appraised the Condas property, its size or shape, whether it was improved or unimproved with buildings, roadways,
hard surfaced and the like, whether it was level or
undulating, filled or unfilled, drained or undrained,
etc. or whether it fronted on 2100 South Street or
on Redwood Road in whole or in part. In fact the
Condas property cornered in the southwest intersection of Redwood Road at 2100 South Street, which
in itself made it dissimilar to any of the subject
property.
What is even more revealing is the manner in
which the question was asked (Tr. 843):
"(BY MR. CAMPBELL) Q. You recall
the - you testified the fair market value of
$10,000 "MR. NOV AK: Objection, your Honor.
"MR. CAMPBELL: I have the right, I
think, to state my question - that you appraised that Condas piece for the landowner
for $10,000 an acre?"
35
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Defendant's counsel was determined to, and he did
get before the jury the figure of $10,000.00 per
acre. What is more, defendant argues here that the
whole purpose of the inquiry was to test the credibility of the witness Johns. However, the inquiry as
made had the dual effect of also tending to establish
the value of the subject property and if permitted to
stand could well have had that result. Thus no inquiry was made to show that in the opinion of the
witness Johns the value of the Condas property and
any part of the subject property was comparable as
a foundation to show prior inconsistent statements
or opinions. Nor did defendant's counsel state to the
court that such was his purpose so the jury could
be instructed accordingly.
Thereupon, after a conference with counsel at
the bench, the trial court sustained the objection
and instructed the jury to disregard the question
and answer (Tr. 843-844). In the trial court's explanation to the jury it was clear that the trial
court had carefully considered defendant's right to
cross examine but was of the judgment that its
value was outweighed by the risks involved in introducing other issues which we did not have time to
resolve in this case. The dual aspects of the inquiry
made it a collateral matter, and to permit it would
have required time consuming re-direct examination to explain all factors that went into Johns'
prior appraisal of the Condas property, which in effect would be to re-try the Condas case and the factors there involved.
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Defendant's suggestion on pages 40 and 41 of
Appellant's Brief that the trial court understood
the question to ask for the "price" paid the abutting owner by the State is wholly distorted and unfounded. The price of the adjoining property referred to was the figure of $10,000.00 per acre in
counsel's question which the jury heard.
As noted on page 43 of Appellant's Brief,
Nichols On Eminent Domain, Volume 5, page 27 4,
Section 18.45(2) (supplement) states that on cross
examination an expert may be questioned as to his
appraisals of other property in the area which he
has made, but only if a foundation has been laid for
comparison of the different tracts appraised. And
as noted above a proper foundation had not been
laid here.
The case of State v. Christensen, 13 Utah (2d)
224, 371 Pac. (2d) 552 (1960) appears to be the
closest Utah case to the case at hand. While the first
two questions set forth on page 228 of the Utah
Reports were directed to what the State paid the
owner of adjoining land for proximity and severance damages and were sustained by the trial court,
the questions were then asked as to whether the witness had appraised the adjoining property for the
State. When asked, "What was your appraisal to
the property on the west?" an objection thereto was
again sustained. And then when asked if there was
any severance damage to the property on the west
an objection thereto was sustained. In passing on
37

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the propriety of those questions and after noting
that cross examination is admissible to test the good
faith, knowledge, credibility and the like of a witness this court stated on page 229 of the Utah Reports as follows:
" ... The answers to the questions above
quoted, especially the first one, would not
have been admissible in evidence even under
cross-examination; and although the witness
did not know or was not allowed to give the
answers, the questions were improper ... "
We do not quarrel with defendant's notion of
the above case that the first and last questions were
clearly improper. However, neither can defendant
quarrel with the holding of this court that it was
improper to ask the witness what was his appraisal
of the adjoining property.
The same argument can be made that such inquiry goes only to test the credibility of the witness,
as defendant argues here. But it is the dual aspect
of the question which creates the problem and
where, as here, the necessary foundation has not
been laid to put it in the light of attacking the credibility of the witness more harm than good can come
of it and it becomes a collateral matter which is and
should be within the discretion of the trial court to
limit. Thus in Nihcols On Eminent Domain, Volume
5, Section 18.45 ( 2), pages 277-278 it is stated:
" ... The extent to which cross-examination will be permitted is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the rulings
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of the court upon this point are not subject
to exception unless wholly arbitrary and unreasonable. The extent of the examination
need not be extended to permit interrogation
about collateral, immaterial or irrelevant
matters."
Here the trial court sustained the objection to
the question after a conference at the bench with
counsel and after carefully weighing defendant's
right of cross examination, evidenced by his explanation to the jury. And it should be noted that defendant did not move for a mistrial or press its claim
of prejudicial error until after the verdict was returned.
The trial court again carefully reconsidered the
matter on defendant's Motion For New Trial and
after a full hearing and considering the Briefs submitted by the respective parties was clearly of the
opinion that defendant was not prejudiced thereby
in denying defendant's Motion For New Trial. This
puts us squarely within the holding of State v.
Christensen, supra, where on page 229 it is stated:
". . . The trial court by denying a motion
for a new trial clearly indicated that he considered that the State was not prejudiced by
these questions. As previously pointed out,
the State did not move for a mistrial or press
its claim of prejudicial error until after the
verdict was returned. We overrule the trial
court's decision on a motion for a new trial
only if we find an abuse of its discretion ... "
Citing Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah (2d) Utah 350,
366 Pac. (2d) 701.
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On page 43 of Appellant's Brief defendant cites
the case of Bingaman v. City of Seattle, 139 Wash.
68, 245 Pac. 411 (9126) as clear authority supporting defendant's position, and in so doing states
that the Washington court found prejudicial error
in the refusal to permit cross examination in a condemnation suit on a prior inconsistent opinion given
by the expert witness on the value of neighboring
land. Defendant then quotes at length from that
case. A careful reading of that case reveals that the
quoted material was dictum. The Washington court
reversed because of inadequacy of the award of
$1.00 nominal damages and remanded, ordering
that judgment be entered for plaintiff in the
amount of $1,000.00, being the lowest estimate of
the City's witness, or, if refused, a new trial.
In Basch v. Iowa Power And Light Co., 95
N.W. (2cl) 714 (Iowa 1959) cited on page 45 of
Appellant's Brief, the three questions referred to
related to ( 1) the prior statement of the opinion of
the witness of a proper formula for determining
the value of the powerline easement on the subject
property; (2) whether payment to him for the same
easement on his adjacent lands on the basis of the
same formula was fair and ( 3) whether the same
formula was used as the basis for his executing the
easement. Needless to say, an entirely different situation there than here.
Likewise the facts in People v. Murata, 326
Pac. (2d) 947 (Cal. 1958) cited on page 46 of Ap40
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pellant's Brief are entirely different than here.
There the witness had given his opinion of value
of the same lands there being condemned in a prior
flood damage suit. Thus all three cases cited and
relied upon by defendant are simply not applicable
to the situation here.
Defendant argues that the alleged prejudice
flows from the fact that the witness Johns' opinion
of the "before" value was substantially less than the
opinions of the other witnesses which changed the
entire atmosphere of the trial and defendant was
prevented from showing that Johns was grossly
misinformed, or he was a fraud or an advocate or
a combination of all three. Defendant's argument
points up the intended dual purpose of the question,
i.e. not necessarily to test credibility but to show
that the "before" value of the subject property was
more than what ,Johns appraised it at. Whether the
question asked was all important is subject to great
debate. And to say we don't know the answer when
the answer obviously was couched in the question
for the jury to hear is being somewhat naive. Likewise, the probability that the answer would have
dealt a devastating blow to the credibility of Johns'
opinion is moot considering the form of the question.
To say 'that this was the pivotal point of the
trial is nonsense. This occurred within the last hour
of the evidence. If there was such a point it occurred many days earlier when defendant's witness
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Solomon dropped the ball and when defendant's witness Kiepe failed to level with the jury.
We submit that it was within the discretion of
the trial court to limit the inquiry. This the trial
court wisely did, and after reconsideration concluded that defendant was not prejudiced thereby. Defendant's argument falls far short of showing any
abuse of discretion, and that being so the judgment
of the trial court denying defendant's Motion For
New Trial must be affirmed. State v. Christensen,
13 Utah (2d) 224, 371 Pac. (2d) 552 (1962).
POINT III.
THE ISSUE OF SPECIAL BENEFITS WAS
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY

The witness Johns stated that in his opinion a
total of 46.23 acres of defendant's remaining lands
surrounding the proposed interchange would be
specially benefited by reason of the construction of
the Belt Route and interchange facility (Tr. 814815). The only objections made by defendant went
to general benefits, which were properly sustained,
and no objection was made when the witness confined his opinion to special benefits (Tr. 815). He
gave as the reason for such special benefits the interchange of the two major traffic arterials which
gave the benefited property what he found generally to be considered by the market as desirable location and that such relationship indicated to him
an additional value of twenty-five percent (Tr.
42
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816). He took into consideration studies which he
made in other areas of land similarly situated with
respect to interchange facilities which had been
constructed (Tr. 816). He used two sales in formulating his opinions on special benefits (Tr. 862)
and took into consideration one sale of a property
similarly situated which sold after that interchange
had been completed (Tr. 866-867).
In Mr. Johns' opinion the special benefits
amounted to $575.00 per acre for the 46.32 acres
specially benefited (Tr. 815; Exh. P-15-A) for a
total of $26,582.00 in special benefits (Tr. 816). He
subtracted that amount from his opinion of the
gross damage of $44,183.00 for a net damage in his
opinion of $17,601.00 (Tr. 815-816; Exh. 12).
Even defendant's witness Solomon was of the
opinion that the remaining property of defendant
would have added visibility, at least in part by reason of the interchange connecting the Belt Route
with the 2100 South Expressway; that this added
visibility would confer a special benefit on defendant's remaining property (Tr. 366) ; and all of
which he took into consideration in arriving at his
opinion of the "after" value of the defendant's remaining property (Tr. 367). In view thereof defendant should not be heard to complain about lack
of special benefits.
As to defendant's argument that it was prevented in the cross examination of the witness Johns
from inquiring into the nature of the special bene43
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fits, we submit that the questions asked were directed to loss of traffic flow on Redwood Road (Tr.
864). The trial court properly sustained the objection since the direct implication was a damage to
defendant's remaining property resulting from taking traffic off Redwood Road and putting it on the
freeway. Defendant concedes on page 51 of Appellant's Brief that it has no right to the flow of traffic. To say the question was directed solely to impeachment of the witness John's opinion on special
benefits is simply to obscure that aspect and the
harm which could result therefrom. In any event,
defendant's argument is moot because the jury was
specifically instructed that it could not consider the
traffic flowing by defendant's remaining property
on the new highway system after the taking as
adding a special benefit (Instruction No. 21; R.
44).
Furthermore, the jury was instructed that the
burden of establishing special benefits, if any, is
the plaintiff's burden and the plaintiff must prove
the same by a preponderance of the evidence (Instruction No. 3; R. 53). Likewise the jury was
carefully instructed on the nature and extent of
special benefits (Instruction No. 15; R. 37). Thus
the jury was instructed that if it found that the
remaining property had been specially benefited by
the construction of the freeway on the property condemned it could consider such special benefits as an
offset against severance damage, if any. The fore44
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going Instruction clearly defined special benefits,
distinguished between special and general benefits,
and that such special benefits, if any, could not be
offset against the value of the land taken. The foregoing Instruction was requested by defendant (R.
60) and is in keeping with the principles of law
pertaining to special benefits as set forth on page
49 of Appellant's Brief. That being so, and under
the evidence in this case, the issue of special benefits
was properly submitted to the jury under the testimony of both plaintiff's witness Johns and defendant's witness Solomon.
POINT IV.
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE WERE PROPER

At the outset it should be noted that defendant
did not except to Instruction No. 30 (Supp. R. 2-4,
incl.). Furthermore, defendant's challenge to Instruction No. 30 on page 55 as being wholly erroneous because it implies that defendant had the burden of proving special benefits or the lack thereof
is not well taken. Instruction No. 30 (R. 53) specifically charges the jury that
" ... The burden of establishing special
benefits, if any, is the plaintiff's and the
plaintiff must prove the same by a perponderance of the evidence ... "
On page 52 defendant acknowledges that the
rule adopted in Utah and followed since early days
45
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places the burden of proving the value of the land
taken and the damages to the remainder on the
landowner. However, defendant asserts that it is a
harsh rule and should be changed prospectively because defendant is of the view that it imposes an
unreasonable burden upon the citizen. That was the
substance of the exception taken by the defendant
to Instruction No. 18 (Supp. R. 2). Our answer
is that it takes more than a mere assertion to
change a rule of evidence so firmly imbedded as
this rule is in Utah. However, defendant apparently
only makes that assertion in passing since on page
53 of Appellant's Brief defendant makes no claim
of prejudicial error therefor.
Defendant's main attack directed to Instructions Nos. 18 and 19 is that they unduly focus on
the same subject matter. What defendant ignores is
that Instruction No. 18 is directed to proving the
contentions of the defendant and Instuction No. 19
is directed to proving the facts in issue. Furthermore Instruction No. 19 is but a further explanation of the meaning of burden of proof and preponderance of evidence couched in different and more
specific language. Thus those Instructions are not
cumulative or repetitive as argued by defendant
and taken together give a clear meaning of the
terms defined. Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah (2d)
294, 400 Pac. (2d) 12 (1965).
Defendant then argues that the effect of the
two Instructions is to direct a verdict against defen46
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darrt if defendant does not meet its full preponderance. Those Instructions simply charge the jury
with the true meaning of the burden of proof, i.e.
first, if defendant did not prove its contentions by a
preponderance of the evidence the jury shall reject
such contentions; and, secondly, if defendant did not
prove the facts which it alleges the jury shall find
against defendant on such facts. If both charges are
incorrect then the burden of proof is meaningless.
Next defendant argues that the trial court
did not instruct the jury that its verdict could be
within the range of the testimony where the weight
fairly preponderated. Yet defendant did not request
such an Instruction, nor did i1t request any Instruction on either burden of proof or preponderance of
the evidence at all. That being so, the defendant
cannot be heard to complain on this appeal about
the trial court's Instructions on either burden of
proof or preponderance of the evidence. Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah (2d) 8, 354 Pac (2d) 564
(1960). We submit that the Instructions thereon
as given by the trial court were wholly proper and
correct.
CONCLUSION
The primary issue in this case was the amount
of damages, if any, to the remaining property of defendant not taken. The trial by jury spanned the
period from January 11, 1966 to January 22, 1966
and the evidence, being primarily opinion in nature,
was voluminous. No serious contention is made by
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defendant that the award of $318,301.00 for the
land taken is inadequate. The opinion evidence on
severance damages ranged from zero to $315,415.00
and the jury, being more liberal than plaintiff's
valuation witnesses and more conservative than defendant's valuation witnesses, resolved that issue
by awarding $41,576.00 in severance damages, being well within the range of the evidence.
The argument of defendant of inadequacy of
the award would require the complete discard of the
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses Fletcher and
Johns. Yet no objection was made to either of their
qualifications when asked for their opinions on
value. It then resolves itself down to the matter of
the weight to be given the opinions of the valuation
witnesses. This was within the exclusive province
of the jury and the jury did its job well. And the
trial court having reviewed the same on defendant's
Motion For New Trial gave further sanctity to the
verdict in denying such motion. That being so, this
court should not change it absent a clear showing
of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court. Appellant's Brief falls far short of that, as
does the record before this court.
Likewise the trial court wisely and within its
discretion limited the cross-examination of the witness Johns as to his prior appraisal of the Condas
property. In so doing it carefully weighed defendant's right of cross-examination against the harm
which could result from the dual aspect of the in48
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quiry by introducing collateral matters which could
not be resolved in this case save and except to re-try
the Condas case and the factors there involved. Defendant did not move for a mistrial or press its
claim of prejudicial error until after the verdict
was returned. The trial court carefully reviewed its
ruling after a full hearing, submission of briefs and
in denying defendant's Motion For New Trial concluded that defendant was not prejudiced thereby.
Neither Appellant's Brief nor the record before this
court show that the trial court abused its discretion
or that defendant was in any manner prejudiced
thereby.
The issue of special benefits was properly submitted to the jury in the court's Instructions under
the testimony of both plaintiff's witness Johns and
defendant's witness Solomon. Instructions Nos. 18,
19 and 30 relating to burden of proof and preponderance of the evidence were correct and proper.
Defendant requested no Instruction on either burden of proof or preponderance of the evidence, nor
did defendant except to Instruction No. 30. That
being so, defendant cannot be heard to complain
about those Instructions on this appeal.
We submit that defendant was well represented at the trial of this case by able counsel as the
record shows throughout, and likewise defendant
received a full and fair trial. And the jury, having
49
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fixed the award of just compensation, which was
well within the range of the evidence, and the award
having received the approval of the trial court, it
must stand. Accordingly, we respectfully submit
that the judgment of the lower court must in all
respects be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General
JOSEPH NOV AK
Special Assistant
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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